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Abstract 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one of the longest-lasting alliances in world history despite 
a large membership with often disparate foreign policy goals.  For many theorists who focus on the 
problem of uncertainty and potential for defection among alliance partners, this is a puzzle – 
particularly given the historical (and even current) animosities between some of the member states.  
How is it that so many states can work together given the structural bias towards distrust in the 
international system?  Given the goal of the papers on this panel to investigate how NATO might in 
fact facilitate trust-building among its members, this paper represents an initial attempt to consider 
how the question of trust can be considered with respect to the existing literature on both alliances 
and NATO.  In doing so, it brings together three literatures: trust theory, alliance theory, and NATO 
studies, in order to reveal the points of intersection that might help us to understand how and why 
trusting relationships can be formed within the NATO alliance.   
Introduction 
Alliances are ubiquitous within the history of international politics and, as such, are the topic of 
major concern for international relations scholars.  As groups of actors coming together to overcome 
their rivals through military means, their existence ‘is as original an event in politics as is conflict.’1  
Major scholars have linked alliances to some of the most fundamental attributes of the international 
system such as the balance of power.2  Kegley and Raymond, equally, note that they are ‘perhaps 
the most visible form of interstate agreement, in the sense not only that they exemplify the politics 
and norms constituting concerted efforts by autonomous actors to commit themselves voluntarily to 
a particularly course of action, but also because they fall into the “high politics” of national security 
policies and therefore command widespread attention.’3   In short, alliances are not only 
widespread, but their importance has been trumped by a large and diverse group of thinkers.   
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At the most basic level, alliances are cooperative formations of states in pursuit of a common goal, 
primarily the preparation for, and prosecution of, a military conflict against a common rival.4  It is 
this military purpose that differentiates alliances from other types of associations or regimes.5  
Moreover, alliances are not just simple alignments of states with common military interests or fears.  
They only exist through formal agreement.  Alliances therefore are not only the behavioral 
representation of pre-existing alignments of interests, but can also act as a means through which 
these alignments are strengthened.6  
Because of their ubiquity and importance to ensuring state security, the academic literature on 
alliances is exceptionally large.  Much of it has as its primary interest both the formation and 
maintenance of alliances given the egoistic nature of states and the pervasive problems of 
uncertainty within an anarchic international system. These two assumptions, egoism and 
uncertainty, drives much of the analysis.  Put simply, given that states are, and given their 
environment must be, distrustful, how do alliances both form and continue to function? 
This paper, reflecting the goals of the panel, attempts to turn this assumption on its head.  Its 
purpose of is to explicitly examine a variable otherwise little considered in the alliance literature: 
trust.  It must be said from the outset that this does not presuppose a belief that trusting 
relationships between alliance members are easy to create or maintain.  Misplaced trust and the 
defection of one or more of the members at a critical moment is always possible, and this fear will 
always serve as a break to the development of trusting relationships.  As Friedman put it succinctly, 
“The mere existence of a relationship based on security or aggrandizement is no guarantee of amity 
or exemption from international rivalry within one’s own immediate circle.”7   The alliance itself is no 
panacea to the potential problem of diverging interests and the possibility of defection.   
The claim is that though it may be difficult for states to develop trusting relationships, we should not 
completely rule out their ability to gradually entrust each other’s security to each other through 
their experiences in alliance structures.  Where the formation of these trusting relationships is 
possible, there are many benefits to an individual state, since being a member of an alliance where 
trusting relationships exist leads to a perceived increase of overall security.8  Thus, instead of 
presupposing that mistrust by necessity must exist in the creation, maintenance, and eventual 
dissolution of alliances, we propose to ask how, if at all, can alliances help to build trusting 
relationships between states within the alliance?   
The subject of study for this question is one of the most well-known alliances in history: the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  What makes NATO substantially different from other alliances 
is both its size and its stability over time.9  These properties make it an interesting subject of trust-
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building between its members.  The size is unusual because, all things being equal, the more states 
in an alliance the more likely it is that their interests will diverge and threaten the existence of the 
alliance.  Despite this, NATO has achieved remarkable stability.  Additionally, it has done so despite 
the fact that some of its members have had conflictual pasts and antagonistic overlapping interests.  
Given both the successes and continuing problems faced by NATO, this panel aims to understand 
whether the alliance itself has helped states form trusting relationships with each other, the effect of 
these trusting relationships on these relationships, and how some alliance partners have had more 
success in entering into a trusting relationship than others.   
The papers on this panel are preconditioned on the idea of specific trust, that is, adopting the 
analytical framework concerned with whether A trusts B to do Z, not whether A trusts B generally.  
As such, we need to ask questions that specify the Z, or the thing to be entrusted between the 
partners.  In this project, we have chosen two specific areas of trust to study.  First, can each state 
trust the other not to defect by deciding to take advantage of them militarily?  This question speaks 
to the problem that entering into an alliance can result in a decrease of tensions and military 
preparedness with respect to the other state that leaves both states potentially vulnerable to a 
sudden change in mood of the other. In the worst case scenario, revisionist powers can join alliances 
exactly to lower the guard of other states and strike at an opportune moment.   
Second, can each state trust that their alliance partners will not abandon them in potential joint 
operations?  This speaks to the perennial issues in the alliance literature about the fears of 
abandonment and entrapment - that the alliance members will not come to their alliance partner’s 
aid when they need it, or that the alliance partner will behave recklessly and drag other members 
into an unwanted conflict.  In this question we are keeping joint operations openly defined such that 
they can also include activities that go beyond the current scope of alliance agreements.  This is an 
important element because, theoretically, there is a question over whether achieving specific trust 
in one area can help to achieve it in other areas and, practically, this responds to disagreements 
within NATO over the benefit and scope of out-of-area operations, which expand the traditional 
remit of the alliance.   
The purpose of this paper is to consider the intellectual environment in which these two questions 
lie.  The first section will introduce the concept of trusting relationships and establish what trust 
literature in international relations is most useful for thinking about the possibility of trusting 
relationships in alliances.  The second section will examine how the research questions are 
considered within the current alliance literature with an aim to show how incorporating the trust 
literature can add to our understanding of state behavior within alliances.  The final section will 
consider these issues with respect to major themes within the scholarly literature that have 
explained the durability of NATO and where these might benefit from a consideration of trust. 
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With the exploration of any sociological concept comes a certain amount of fragmentation over 
definition and meaning.  This is no different with trust.  Despite the lack of consensus, conversations 
about trust in international relations have fallen into roughly three discrete categories: those who 
see trust as a rational phenomenon, a psychological phenomenon, and a social phenomenon.10  In 
order to understand how trust theory might help us to understand alliances, we need to ascertain 
which theoretical approaches might be useful given the specified research questions.  This section 
seeks to defend the utility of both social and, to some extent, rational approaches to trust over 
psychological understandings.   
The focus of psychological trust research revolves around how trust affects the decision-making of 
individuals in leadership positions.  The goal is to understand why different individuals are able to 
live with greater complexity, that they have a greater “tolerance of uncertainty,”11 and what political 
effects arise from differences in this capability among political leaders. One of the more 
sophisticated theories of trust from a psychological perspective is the generalized trust approach of 
Brian Rathbun.  Rathun argues for the importance of generalized trusters, that is, individuals who are 
psychologically predisposed to trust in any given situation.  Generalized trusters exist because trust 
is not simply a rational calculation, but has a moralistic component that differs in importance among 
individuals.  
His research suggests that the presence or absence of individuals who are generalized trusters in US 
leadership positions has effects on how multilateral institutions are created.  This is because 
generalized trusters will be more likely to accept institutions with binding commitments than those 
who are not.12 As Rathbun puts it, ‘A belief that others are generally and inherently trustworthy 
provides the confidence needed to cooperate even when the gains from cooperation are 
inconsistent over a long period of time. Where generalized trust is lacking, states will insist on 
specific reciprocity, as they will be less certain that others will honor their agreements’13 Rathbun 
maps the propensity to trust on the social psychology of the left and right, claiming that the more 
liberal you are, the more likely you are to be a generalized truster.14   
It would seem that this result would have practical effects for studying trust in military alliances.  
Where general trusters are in positions of power of key states, we would expect that more cohesive 
and binding military alliances, such as NATO, could be formed.  However, there is a major problem 
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that makes Rathbun’s generalized trust theory less useful for the study of alliances than it might 
seem on the face of things.   
Because it is an individual level theory - that is, that the degree of generalized trust in a state is 
dependent on the ability of those in power to win domestic political contests - it cannot explain long-
term trusting relationships but for an appeal to the continuous character of the leadership.  
Rathbun’s approach suggests that alliances such as NATO are highly dependent on the continuous 
left-wing nature of key governments, since absent the presence of general trusters, states will begin 
to back away from commitments they now find too risky.  Rathbun states this explicitly concerning 
the NATO alliance, arguing that the members require moralistic trust to feel assured that the others 
will come to their aim, since there is an absence of specific reciprocity.15   
Given that the continuous left-wing nature of NATO government is simply not empirically valid, then 
there is no explanation from this perspective for the continued success of the organization.  This is 
perhaps why when Rathbun deals with NATO as a case study to defend the importance of 
generalized trust, he only discusses the short period of time when NATO was forming.16  When it 
comes to the question of why NATO has continued to endure and now commands bipartisan support 
within the United States, he abandons his framework of psychological trust and suggests a 
sociological explanation in the creation of a common identity among the NATO members based on 
sixty years of shared experiences.17  This common identity, a sociological phenomenon, in turn, 
generates the moralistic trust needed to sustain the relationships.18  As such, in its inability to 
account for long-term sources of trust within the alliance structures, psychological theories such as 
Brian Rathbun’s are of limited use to answer the research questions posed.   
We are thus left with two possibilities: using rationalist trust theory or using social trust theory.  
Rational theories of trust are useful to understand alliance dynamics because they engage with the 
problem of uncertainty that is present in international politics.  This is of particular importance for 
security politics since the costs of defection by an alliance member, whether it be in the form of 
abandonment or using the alliance to launch a surprise strike against an alliance member, can be 
very high.  Understanding whether an alliance member is likely to be trustworthy is therefore of the 
utmost importance.   
Within rational trust theory, where there are two contenders. The first is a theory by Russell Hardin, 
who argues that trust is a matter of encapsulated interest, or the situation where ‘I trust you 
because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously in the 
following sense: You value the continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own 
interests in taking my interests into account.’19   With respect to alliances, understanding trust in this 
sense focusses our investigations on the belief of the NATO states that the relationship will continue 
that creates positive benefits.  On the basis of the continuation of both the relationship and the 
mutual benefits, trust is conferred.  Absent both the benefits and the expectation of a continued 
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relationship, NATO members should leave the alliance. Though Hardin’s theory uses the word ‘trust’ 
as its central concept, in practice, this does not lead us far from the simple idea that states will do 
things that have positive expected values, making alliance defection a potentially major issue should 
the situation cause one or more states to believe that they do not have anything more to gain from 
membership. 
A second version of rational trust that complicates this is offered by Andrew Kydd.  This differs from 
Hardin’s view in that it does not assume that states calculate interests on a case-by-case basis, but 
that particular states have particular types: those that will reciprocate cooperation due to having 
general interests in common or having a status quo orientation, and those that are likely to defect or 
have a revisionist orientation.20  Kydd defines the level of trust as the probability that the other 
believes the other to have similar preferences, or in his parlance, is trustworthy.21 The problem of 
trust thus revolves around resolving the uncertainty over the other state’s type so that cooperation 
can occur between those identified as trustworthy and avoided with those identified as 
untrustworthy.   
Using Kydd’s rational trust theory to understand alliances is a somewhat difficult because of the way 
he changes the focus of trust in his different articles.  Whether trust is about having a status-quo 
orientation or general interests in common matters with respect to alliance politics.  If having a 
status-quo orientation is the measure of trustworthiness, then the key problem could be whether 
states can find other states that are of a status-quo orientation to form a stable alliance.  But this is 
complicated by the fact that revisionist states or a mix of states with revisionist and status quo 
preferences can form security alliances together given the nature of the external threat.  So using 
the status quo/revisionist dichotomy as the indicator of trustworthiness in an alliance structure faces 
immediate problems.  The problem of trust in alliances, therefore, is better thought of from Kydd’s 
perspective as one of the uncertainty over whether the alliance partners have similar enough 
preferences to respect their alliance commitments.  This can include, but is not limited to, their 
status-quo or revisionist preferences.  But by focusing on general preferences, Kydd’s theory permits 
potentially more stability within alliances than Hardin might allow.   
The last major theoretical group, the social theories of trust, share the psychological theories’ 
emphasis on trust not simply as a rational prediction. Trust, “occurs within a framework of 
interaction which is influenced by both personality and social system, and cannot be exclusively 
associated with either.”22  It has an explicitly intersubjective quality comes about because an actor 
cannot demand the trust of another, but rather, it is something that can only be offered and 
accepted.23   
Social trust theories do not completely discount the importance of rationality to trust-building.  
Indeed, trust cannot occur without some type of observation and speculation of the intentions of 
                                                          
20
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the other.  But instead of staying within a rationalist framework, social theories of trust note how 
trust takes familiarity with another from the past, and instead of merely drawing inferences from it, 
goes beyond the information given to define the future.24  As Luhamann notes, in almost all cases 
‘no decisive grounds can be offered for trusting; [because] trust always extrapolates from the 
available evidence.’25   Trust is thus not strictly rational, in fact, it rests on a particular type of illusion.  
In reality there is not enough information available to assure success of any trusting venture.  What 
we do when we trust is to subjectively create a less-complex system that replaces the objective 
world, drawing selectively from the data we have and, importantly, ‘overdrawing on the 
information.’26   
The manifestation of trust in international politics for social theorists is the trusting relationship.27  
Trusting relationships are important because they suggest the possibility of long-term stability 
outside of rational prediction under uncertainty (as the the rational approach suggests) or 
propensity of changing leaderships to trust (as the psychological approach suggests).  At the 
maximum extent, trust can be ‘thoughtless, careless and routinized, and thus to require no 
unnecessary expenditure of consciousness.’28  In other words, when the reduction takes place in an 
intersubjective agreement, it is simply experienced as true.29   
Social trust scholars are primarily interested in how it is that the social environment affects the way 
that actors overdraw on their environment to make trusting or distrusting decisions, and how those 
decisions themselves might affect the social environment for other actors. For instance, Aaron 
Hoffman is interested in what he calls the fiduciary approach to trust, where to trust is not simply to 
believe someone to is likely keep to their agreement, but also that there are social elements to trust 
that make keeping the agreement an upright or honorable thing to do.30  Another version of social 
trust theory, proposed by Kegley and Raymond, focuses on pre-existing social norms or rules against 
breaking agreements that facilitate trusting relationships.  They point out that promissory 
obligations on the part of states frames almost all international politics, even if there is a debate 
over whether or not these obligations are flexible or binding.31  Although an anarchical environment 
promotes distrust, states do not routinely enter into agreements through deceit.  Instead, they reach 
agreements ‘with the expectation of complying with their promises so as to realize the benefits they 
negotiated.’32  This suggests that the relative strength of the norm that states should honor 
agreements will have an effect on the ability of states to develop trusting relationships.  This can 
take two forms:  either the actor either internalizes that the alliance obligations must be respected 
as a norm unto itself, or that they believe that breaking the norm and defecting will be costly to their 
external reputation because a significant number of other states believe the norm to be important.  
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If norms strongly support the sanctity of agreements, then trust will be something on which states 
can rely.33 
Theories of social trust attempt to supplement rational theories by including a social obligation to 
the predictive element of trust.  This is important for the stability of alliances because, where 
possible, it means that alliances will be more stable than other theories might predict because states 
will consider obligation they owe as part of the rational calculation of whether to defect or not.  
Furthermore, where norms of reciprocity and promise-keeping are strong, states must additionally 
consider the costs of defection not only from their alliance partner, but also from other states within 
the social environment.   
Different theories of trust thus then have within them the potential for theorizing the relative 
stability or instability of alliances given the assumptions they make in how trust works.  Given these 
differences, in what way can they illuminate what have been the primary concerns in the alliance 
literature with respect to the central research questions?  In order to engage with both theories of 
trust and alliances, the next section will show where trust literature can help the existing alliance 
literature, both in terms of where it reinforces some of the existing ideas and where it adds to the 
discussion.   
Alliances 
The study of alliances has focused primarily around two questions: how is it that they initially form 
and how is it they can be maintained.  Without discounting the importance of the first question, this 
project is primarily centered around the second question.  That is, once the alliance is formed, can 
trusting relationships be built?  Given the previously stated interested in examining specific trust, 
that is, that states trust each other to do specific things and not simply in general, this section is 
organized around the two questions we have already posed:  whether each state trust the other not 
to defect by deciding to take advantage of them militarily, and whether each state trust that their 
alliance partners will not abandon them in potential joint operations.   
Possibility of Defection 
As we stated from the outset of this paper, most of the literature on alliance maintenance ignores 
the possibility of trusting relationships forming.  Instead, alliances are simply considered to be 
collections of rational actors attempting to maximize their security in an uncertain environment.  
Absent any factors other than self-interest, these actors will join, change, and abandon alliances 
where they feel it necessary.  Most alliances should be unstable and temporary.34  So states will also 
be aware of the possibility of gaining an advantage over the other alliance members through either 
defecting from the alliance or switching sides to other alliances where this best meets their interests.   




 Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics," 10-11.  The extent to which alliances are unstable will be 
related to the interests served in the alliance.  Alliance members do not have to have the same preferences in 
all areas for the alliance to operate.  So long as the specific purpose of the alliance are held in the common 
interest of all the states, other interests can vary where they do not conflict with these core goals.  This means 
that, in general, the more permanent the alliance, the more limited interests it is likely to serve Morgenthau, 
Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 193., the more interests it serves, the less 
permanent we should expect the alliance to be.  The more interests held in the alliance together, the more 
likely that one or more will diverge among the members over time. 
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There are a number of ways that trust research might help to understand how and why this 
pessimistic take on alliances might overstated.  For instance, from the rationalist trust literature we 
can understand how states constantly probe each other for trustworthy or untrustworthy signals.  If 
a state is deemed untrustworthy, then trustworthy states will refuse to cooperate with it, expecting 
defection.  Any failure to live up to the expectations of the alliance or complete defection to another 
side might have longer term consequences on reputation of the state, particularly if it frequently 
defects, since states are then more likely to then be considered untrustworthy.35  We can see this 
taken up briefly in the alliance literature when Synder argues that states wishing to avoid 
abandonment might also decide to ensure that they have a reputation for loyalty.36   
To the extent that potential future cooperation is valued, states within alliances will be restrained in 
their defection, making the likelihood of automatically taking advantage of the other states when 
the situation arises smaller. Additionally, we can use Kydd’s framework to take this argument one 
step further. If states do act knowing that they will be potentially judged as untrustworthy and face 
potential costs of non-cooperation, then joining an alliance itself can be seen as a mechanism for 
signaling type.  This can explain Snyder’s argument that entering into a formal alliance can act as a 
signal to increase the confidence of all of the members that there are similar interests at stake, and 
thus the state is trustworthy.37  
Kydd’s trust framework also provides an understanding of not only the level of trust states have 
between them, but also how the payoffs should be considered.38  This is important because alliance 
commitments, as much as they are commitments to the other members, are also potential threats 
to adversaries.  This might have such usefulness or utility that, as Snyder puts it, ‘Even when an ally 
has betrayed one’s trust, one may still want to keep one’s own commitment in order to preserve 
one’s reputation for resolve in the adversary’s eyes.’39  Thus though defections might reduce the 
level of trust among the alliance partners, the alliance might survive if the expected value is still 
positive given other possibilities. 
Finally, there are potential social effects that could prevent the defection of states from the alliance.  
This comes from the idea that alliances, once formed, can then have independent effects on the 
member states. Snyder suggests that the act of allying itself may create interests that did not exist 
previously and may redefine the sense of ‘self’ among the states so that their partners’ interests 
seem more like their own.40  Like Hoffman stresses, Snyder argues that, ‘Formal alliances introduce a 
sense of obligation not present in tacit alignments.’41  As such, the actor either internalizes that the 
alliance obligations must be respected as a norm unto itself, or that they believe it to be damaging to 
their external reputation should they decide to defect because other states will view them 
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negatively for breaking the norm.  Where this is the case, there are two means to ensure that those 
states that have a low marginal utility of membership stay in the alliance.  States can persuade them 
not to defect, can coerce them not to, or some combination of the two.  In persuasion, they will rely 
on moral appeals to deter the possibility of breach.42  So there are not only rational features that 
stabilize alliance behavior, but also the potential for socialization to occur once in the alliance 
structure that changes interests and duties. 
The means through which any international norm of trust varies is dependent on the sense of 
obligation to keep promises, and this will vary depending on the international environment.  In 
general, ‘When doubts over alliance reliability are pervasive and states, are not expected to uphold 
their agreements, a permissive order arises.  Conversely, when the sanctity of agreements is widely 
embraces, as restrictive order emerges.’   They argue that this has to do with the institutionalization 
of patterns of behavior.  Behavior over time transforms from positive to normative, reinforcing the 
norm.   Snyder does suggest that states could ensure that the contract of the alliance benefits the 
ally they believe might abandon them, they could signal their commitment through public 
statements and interstate diplomatic communications, or to support the wavering ally in specific 
conflicts to increase its expected value out of the alliance.43  Thus the strength of any norm of 
keeping promises that makes trusting relationships easier to attain requires states to continuously 
signal that this is an expectation.   
With respect to the possibility of defecting from the alliance, we can see that trust literature can be 
successfully integrated into much of the alliance literature.  In fact, in many instances it provides the 
explanation to what were otherwise conjectures.  What is means for the study of alliances is that 
there are factors that maintain alliances that need to be considered: the potential to be seen as 
untrustworthy, the potential to believe that obligations are important, and finally the potential for 
there to be a social environment that reinforces a norm of promise keeping. 
Possibility of Joint-Operations 
The second question we must consider is whether members of the alliance should be able to trust 
each other to conduct joint operations together.  In general, alliance agreements will stipulate what 
the commitment and duties are to a particular problem.  This formality is designed to reduce the 
uncertainty in behavioral expectations on all sides.44  All of this is particularly the case with alliances, 
given that there is always a feared possibility of the breach of alliance agreements, leading to 
‘statecraft influenced by mutual suspicion about the reliability of allies.’45  This is particularly the 
case because no one in the alliance can know whether changed circumstances makes it such that 
other alliance members will believe that the costs of the alliance outweigh the benefits.46  
There is already some alliance literature suggesting that there is a social element that goes beyond 
the written text of the alliance agreement itself.  As Snyder puts it, ‘Allies expect their partners to 
support them on a variety of issues short of war, including diplomatic crises, even though there is 
nothing in the alliance treaty requiring it.  To withhold such support, at least when it does not run 
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drastically counter to the partner’s own interests, is likely to weaken the solidarity of the alliance.’47  
As such, the alliance is more than the legal agreement, but encompasses larger norms of support, 
assistance, and friendship that are reenacted.48  Similarly, Kegley and Raymond note that where 
norms of reciprocity are seen as valuable, ‘the partner’s need for aid, along with norms of promise-
keeping and reciprocity, may be strong enough to counter the disparity of underlying interests.’49 
States thus might join with their partners even if they do not have a direct interest in the matter.   
Coming at this problem from a perspective of specific trust changes adds another dimension to the 
analysis.  Because specific trust requires something to be trusted in, this opens up the question as to 
whether achieving a trusting relationship in one area might facilitate the trusting relationship in 
another area.  With respect to this project, therefore, we might ask whether or not forming a 
trusting relationship in one area, such as not militarily taking advantage of another alliance member, 
helps to form trusting relationships in other areas, such as supporting allies in joint operations.   
Thus we might be able to build a series of trusting expectations within an alliance.  First, that the 
other states do not use the alliance for their own gain in then attacking one of their fellow alliance 
members who would not be expecting it.  Secondly, it is assumed that the alliance members, 
particularly in a defensive alliance, will come to the aid of the other state if attacked by a third-party.  
Thirdly, it might be expected that certain defined cooperation on external policy be taken outside of 
simple defense.  From a social perspective, in every case, a trusting relationship means that there is 
an expectation that the promises be fulfilled that must be included in the calculation of the state 
making the decision to either cooperate or defect.  So is there any transferability of trust within the 
alliance? Kegley and Raymond have already noted that ‘trust among allies may be divisible’, such 
that ‘allies in one issue area are not necessarily cooperative in another issue area.’50  But under what 
conditions might this have been possible? 
This section has outlined the several ways in which trust theory might interface with existing thinking 
on alliances within the scope of the two research questions.  First, can provide an explicit mechanism 
for propositions already made with the literature and show why particular conclusions that are not 
currently theoretically supported work.  Second, with this information it can provide the basis for 
exploring how these mechanisms might work in practice.  Lastly, it provides the means through 
which we might be able to understand the development of alliances through the linkages between 
areas of specific trust.   
Finally, given that this project is using the NATO alliance as its case study, it needs to engage with the 
large body of empirical literature particular to this alliance.  The last section therefore attempts to 
bring this discussion about alliances and trust into the NATO literature, specifically to consider what 
it is about the NATO alliance might prove fertile grounds for trust-building. 
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The NATO alliance started as a casus foederis alliance, or a defensive alliance.51  Though there is a 
common enemy in defensive alliances that provides an incentive for the states to work together, 
there are always going to be problems among the alliance members.  This is no different within 
NATO, given the number of problems the organization has had to overcome or mitigate in its almost 
70-year history.  A great deal of ink has been spilled on the trials and tribulations of the alliance, 
particularly over perceived disharmonies of interest.  It is exactly in the potential for disharmonies of 
interest that trusting relationships are important, since they provide the glue that prevents the 
alliance from immediately falling apart.   
This is important for NATO because scholars have questioned whether NATO is even a cohesive 
alliance from the very beginning.  As Hotz put it in 1953, ‘NATO’s major problem has been to 
establish a reasonable harmony among dissimilar national interests.’52 Though there were problems 
throughout the Cold War, this problem of disharmonies reared its head in a major way after the fall 
of the Soviet Union.  With the disappearance of the primary opposition of the defensive alliance, 
there was speculation that NATO would be quite vulnerable to failure and dissolution,53 since 
without the common Soviet threat there could be an increasing mismatch between the strategic 
priorities of all of the states.54   
This was witnessed in a series of crises for the alliance.  One major theme was the continuous 
accusations of free-riding among the alliance members.55  Even as recently as 2011, Robert Gates 
accused the European allies of being ‘willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the 
growing security burden,’56 thereby threatening the continued existence of the alliance.57 The 
problem is highly visible when it comes to post-Cold War NATO operations.  For instance, in Kosovo 
the United States was responsible for 70% of all air sorties.58   Even the unity expressed by the Article 
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5 declaration after 9/11 was quickly subsumed by the divisions over burden-sharing in Afghanistan 
has been pointed to as a crisis in the alliance over defining and addressing threats.59   
The debates over burden-sharing are embedded within larger conflicts within NATO on NATO’s post-
Cold War goals and operations.  Initial calls from the United States suggested a move from heavy 
armored based forces to take on the Soviets to a more flexible force with more expeditionary 
elements for deployment to areas outside of member state territory.60 However, the promotion of 
out-of-area operations has been an issue of contention within the alliance.  The popular belief in the 
United States was that NATO had to go ‘out of area or out of business,’ whereas the European allies 
were focused on limiting this to operations within Europe.61  
Out of area operations were particularly problematic for Germany, who has serious reservations 
based on their history and constitutional tradition.62  This along with similar concerns from other 
alliance members created tensions in the alliance coming to terms with how best to deal with the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.63  These problems were only magnified by 9/11, when President 
Bush pushed for NATO members of demonstrate a willingness to operate beyond Europe, not simply 
extend democracy and liberalism eastward.64  Internal debates revolved around have over whether 
the alliance should become some kind of global policeman in response to the risk of terrorism, with 
the United States pushing for this redefinition and European allies reluctant to embrace this 
change.65 
So there is no shortage of issues that could potentially fragment the NATO alliance.  So many, in fact, 
that as a former US ambassador to NATO put it, ‘The lack of coterminous interests makes it 
remarkable that NATO is able to make any headway at all.’66 No doubt part of what drives the crisis-
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driven responses to NATO is the idea that where goals (temporarily) diverge, the fall of the alliance 
must follow.  But despite all of the problems in the 1990s, the invocation of Article 5 after the 9/11 
attacks showed that NATO governments were prepared to honor their treaty obligations even if it 
meant that they risked becoming the next target of terrorism.67   
So why is it that NATO members stay in an alliance with so many divisions?  Should these divisions 
signal that there is a real disharmony of interest that puts alliance commitments, let alone to 
operate outside of the formal alliance commitments, in doubt?  Just because NATO has been 
reasonably stable in the face of adversity does not trust must be the glue that holds the alliance 
together. Thus we must consider what explanations currently exist in the literature for NATO 
longevity and cooperation to see how they might interface with the trust literature. 
Trust and NATO 
Among the scholarly works written on the subject, scholars have put forward a number of 
possibilities explaining the relative stability and cooperation among NATO allies.  The key arguments 
are bipolarity, institutional structures, the specific form of military cooperation, and democratic 
norms.  This section reviews the key arguments in these categories in order to see which have the 
potential for trust to play a part. 
The first explanation of NATO’s longevity points to the bipolar system of alliances that developed 
after the end of the Second World War.  Unlike previous alliance structures, which were reasonably 
flexible in terms of membership, the bipolar system created rival blocs were both inflexible in 
membership and ideologically antagonistic.  Chatterjee suggests that this situation ensured that 
shifting alliance structures were replaced by adjustments through the give and take of the arms 
race.68  The conditions of bipolarity were also important for the stability of the alliance since the 
difference between the superpower and all the other states creates a clear hierarchy, reducing 
possible inter-alliance struggles for predominance.69   
This provides an argument for stability that excludes the role of trust-building, though with two 
caveats.  First, bipolarity itself could have strengthened trust-building between the member states.  
There is no necessary either/or between the structure of the international system and the 
possibilities of trust-building.  Second, this argument clearly holds only for the Cold War, and NATO’s 
success has continued far beyond this.   
Others explain the relative stability through the structure of NATO, with formal and elaborate 
institutional structures for decision-making.70  As a former Secretary General of the organization put 
it, “NATO is a unique institution. It features, first of all, an exceptional political consultation 
mechanism that is geared towards consensus. This consensus process is sometimes perceived as 
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slow and cumbersome. But it has distinct advantages. It creates a sense of predictability. And it 
fosters both a responsibility and a pre‐disposition among the Allies—big and small—to seek common 
solutions to problems.”71  Some scholars have already linked the structure of the organization 
directly to its ability to generate trusting relationships.  Chris Donnelly has previously noted that 
“NATO is the international institution par excellence for developing networks of trust between 
individuals from different countries and different agencies. It is precisely on the basis of trust that 
information and intelligence is most readily shared. It is pointless for governments to legislate for 
information exchange if the basis of mutual trust is absent.”72  Equally, Mark Webber argued that the 
alliance was useful in preventing conflict between the members by ‘increasing trust and 
transparency,’73 echoing the rationalist perspective on trust. Though these scholars have not 
engaged in trust theory, their arguments provide us with the suggestion that there is something 
about the institutional structure that might foster the development of trusting relationships among 
the member states.   
A further element is the explicit cooperation between NATO members in prospective war fighting.  
This trait was evident since a 1948 US Defense Department strategic concept paper that suggested 
the alliance should but be integrated based on an international division of labor - not simply one 
where members fight independent wars against a common foe.74  Military integration in peacetime 
was an important innovation because it provided the training and equipment to fight as one force if 
and when the time came.75  It also provided a structural force against the potential renationalization 
of security across Europe that sustained a stable peace within the alliance.76  This integration also 
included sharing an unprecedented amount of information about their respective militaries and 
future plans, allowing for a historic level of transparency and integration within the alliance.77 This 
pooling was historically new since NATO members ‘not only pooled their resources within the 
framework of NATO’s unified military commands, they encouraged their allies to grow stronger so 
they could do more for the common good.’78  In sum, John Duffield has noted that “By damping the 
security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security 
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policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the 
region virtually inconceivable.”79   
There is no doubt that states, in specializing their militaries to work within the larger alliance 
structure, must have some type of trust in their alliance partners to come to their aid when 
necessary.  Otherwise they would not take the risk in an otherwise uncertain environment.  The 
necessity of trust is particularly in play with the pressures to create a leaner alliance where each 
state provides core capabilities.  As Hans Bennendijk has put it, this “requires a high degree of trust 
that allied nations will provide capabilities another nation has given up to specialise in their 
missions”80  This variable is interesting from a trust perspective, because its very existence suggests a 
trusting relationship to begin with, but at the same time it can serve to solidify or advance the 
trusting relationships already in existence.   
The last argument for NATO longevity points to its role not simply as a security institution, but as a 
democratic institution.  This it was not simply that NATO was different from other historical alliances 
because it was permanent, open-ended, and highly institutionalized, but that it for the most part 
had a membership composed of states ‘sharing a common heritage, common values, and common 
interests, backed by a willingness to pool their resources in peacetime as well as wartime for the 
sake of defending and advancing those common values and interests.”81  Some authors have argued 
that reinforcing these shared norms of liberal democracy was particularly important early in the 
alliance’s history given the domestic weakness of the European states.82  Equally, the fact that NATO 
was explicitly anti-communist might have been just as significant as the promotion of democratic 
values.83 The fact that the NATO alliance was composed of primarily democracies meant that, unlike 
non-democracies, there are positive payoffs for talking things through and being seen to save the 
alliance by coming to agreement,84 so the character of the states magnified the institutional 
elements driving communication. This could be why throughout NATO history the members did not 
try to break the alliance when disagreements arose, some of which were reasonably strong.  Instead, 
they attempted to mobilize support for their side within the alliance in order to pressure the other 
state to change their preferences.85  Constructivist scholars in particular tend to focus on the way 
that NATO has either reconfigured or reaffirmed the Western and democratic identity that it holds in 
a post 9/11 world.  In this sense, NATO is not a conventional alliance, but an organization whose 
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identity is based on the shared democratic foundations of the members.86  NATO, as such, is a 
‘constitutive entity’ that can both influence and shape the preferences and perceptions of states.87   
Liberals, similarly, focus on how NATO has been linked with notions of democracy and freedom, 
promoting a set of liberal democratic values.88  So the question for the study of trust is whether the 
liberal democratic nature of the NATO states and the institutionalization of liberal democracy within 
the alliance aids in trust-building, particularly as some authors have already noted that the 
commonality between the members in terms of liberal democracy promotes group loyalty and 
trust.89   
Looking at the existing literature on NATO therefore gives us a start in thinking about potential 
mechanisms of trust-building within the alliance, whether it be the institutional nature of the 
alliance, the plans for collective defense, or the persistence of liberal democratic norms and liberal 
democratic states. Which of these, if any, might have been important for forging trust, and is there a 
different answer depending on the thing being entrusted?   
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to consider how the two research questions about trust-building in 
the NATO alliance that frame this project intersect with the existing literature on trust, alliances, and 
NATO.  It did so by bringing together the three different literatures to map out the major themes, 
overlaps, and potential innovations among them.  First, it suggested that rational and social theories 
of trust are likely more useful in the study of alliances than psychological theories.  Second, it 
demonstrated how trust theory interacted with current thinking on alliances in terms of the two 
research questions, suggesting that not only could trust theory fill in the gap for expectations already 
in the literature, but it added a new dimension in considering the links between domains of specific 
trust.  Third, it reviewed the literature on NATO that currently explains the success of the alliance as 
a means to suggest where initial research could be done in pinning down the causal forces for 
successful trust-building.    
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